Dormer and O`Hara

Dormerand O’Hara


Nameof Student

Dormerand O’Hara

Question#1 Failure and Error

O’Haradefines failure as something foretold going erroneous. It is theinability to achieve a particular goal or objective. Error, on theother hand, is something, which was unanticipated. From experience,most corporation I have worked for identify with this difference.Punishing failure helps to shape subsequent actions and behaviorthis is a bitter experience of how we get to learn from them (O’Hare,2012). The study also shows that the amount of activity in theposterior medial frontal cortex, popularly known as the PMFC region,is forecasted on learning from error mostly through reward andpunishment. These two the learning from failure and punishment, arenot mutually exclusive since they complement each other. We learnfrom errors through discipline and the bitter experience of it.

Inan organization setting, discipline is likely to send a more powerfulmessage to the employees regarding their conduct. Notably, this isbecause the workers may not feel the cost of error instead, theburden is likely to fall on the company. Therefore, punishing theemployees openly will make them share the burden and learn from sucha sour experience. Personally, I made an error while working as aHuman Resource Manager in a medium sized restaurant during theholidays (O’Hare, 2012). There was this particular staff member whowas so fast and efficient in serving customers, being my duty toappraise the personnel based on performance, I made an error ofgiving Anna a high score in customer relationship centered solely onmy observation of her speed on serving clients. It turned out thatshe was destitute in customer relation and the restaurant had infact, lost some consumers as a result of her behavior. My superiorhad to slash my allowance, and hers too to cater for the lossesincurred.

Question#2Terrorism Failure

Inthe past, there have been instances where the FBI’s structure andrules have brought great disappointments in the coordination ofterror investigations. One of the disappointments was the FBI’santiquated information systems back in 2001. It is said that,immediately after 9/11, the FBI’s IT infrastructure was so oldfashioned such that, frustrated agents from Tampa were unable to sendphotos of the 19 hijackers to all the Regional Offices of the Bureau.They later had to resort to overnight mail.

TheFBI has also made errors of prioritizing issues, the consequenceshave been terrible, and a notable example in recent years is that ofBoston and now New York. In these, both cases, the prime suspect, ineach incident, suspected of carrying out the attacks had beeninvestigated and later cleared by the FBI. As a result, this showslux priority on terror by the FBI if they could have dug a littlebit dipper, these attacks could have been prevented. A joint taskforce can increase the efficiency of war against terror. Terrorists’organizations are no match against shared intelligence as well asresources of several law enforcement agencies. Similarly, a jointtask force at the national or regional level can thwart terrorismwithin a large scale there is a need for leaders to makelegislation, which allow shared intelligence between agencies andcountries, this strategy can effectively be of assistance in curbingthis menace.

Question#3 Perspectives

Byreferring to the MOVE and Waco incidents, O’Hara is trying toexpose some tactical errors made during the raid he also tries todisplay how people have different perspectives on issues. O’Hara,also hints in what ways the agency was flawed at the time. Things arenot as they always seem, and there are always other interpretations(O’Hare, 2012). When there is a road accident, or an incident likeWaco or MOVE, police normally try to interview many witnesses andtake their statements in order to have a broader view of whathappened. Besides, there is always many different perspectives as towhat occurred (Dormer, 1997). Therefore, one of the benefits ofpeople coloring their interpretation on critical incidents is that weget to have a broad view of what transpired. However, too muchcoloring can distort the reality, and when this happens, the truth islost.

It’salways important to get facts right from the myriad of differentperspectives as earlier discussed. There are several tools that onecan use to get the facts. First, you can rephrase the question orstatement and see whether you will get the same answer as theprevious one. Second, challenge the perspective or the assumptionoffered, this helps one to identify the faults in these various viewsor assumptions as people try to defend them. Finally, one can alsochunk up several pieces of perspectives and come up with a generalopinion or perception.

Question#4 Shots in the Bronx

Applying,the reality model in a fatal encounter between police and thecivilian, Amadou Diallo, assists us to develop self-reflection, delaygratification, and have notions control. Mostly, this model helps usidentifying some underlying belief system, in this case, racialprofiling/discrimination (Dormer, 1997). It teaches the significanceof tracing maladaptive behavior and replace them over time. Likewise,this incident also teaches us to be cautious and meticulous when weapproach a problem.

TheNYPD was vulnerable to such an event because of the underlying beliefsystem of racial discrimination. Adding more police to boost securitywithout addressing the indignant belief of racial profiling cannotimprove the security of the country law of diminishing return. Apparently, there is a decrease in the incremental output in theproduction process as the amount of one of the factors of making isincreased and the other aspects of the invention are kept constant(Dormer, 1997). Crime reduction is to be approached in a systematic,logical, and diagnostic procedure described by Dietrich Dormer.


O’Hare,P. (2012). WhyLaw Enforcement Organizations Fail,Durham, NC: Carolina


Dormer,D, (1997). TheLogic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Errors in Complex

Situations,Cambridge:MA Perseus Books.